Emory Corporate Governance and Accountability
Review
Volume 1

Issue 1

2014

A Skeptic's View of Benefit Corporations
Kent Greenfield

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/ecgar

Recommended Citation
Kent Greenfield, A Skeptic's View of Benefit Corporations, 1 Emory Corp. Governance & Accountability Rev.
17 (2014).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/ecgar/vol1/iss1/3

This Essay is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Emory Law Scholarly Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Emory Corporate Governance and Accountability Review by an authorized editor of
Emory Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact law-scholarly-commons@emory.edu.

GREENFIELD GALLEYSFINAL

1/12/2015 3:50 PM

A SKEPTIC’S VIEW OF BENEFIT CORPORATIONS
Kent Greenfield∗
The harm that can flow from businesses pursuing profits above all else has
become more obvious over the last few years. The global financial crisis, the
Deep Horizon well disaster, and the factory collapse of Bangladesh all show
the dangers of allowing businesses to focus on profit while ignoring
externalities and potential risks.
We are in the midst of a historical moment in which some of the core ideas
of business, and of the law that governs it, is being reconsidered. What are
corporations for? Do they owe responsibilities to stakeholders other than
shareholders? To society in general?
There is something of a bandwagon effect occurring now around the notion
that a narrow focus in corporate boardrooms on shareholder interest and
shareholder profit is not only bad for society as a whole but also bad for
shareholders. An article in the Harvard Business Review last year proclaimed
that “there’s a growing body of evidence . . . that the companies that are most
successful at maximizing shareholder value over time are those that aim
toward goals other than maximizing shareholder value. Employees and
customers often know more about and have more of a long-term commitment
to a company than shareholders do.”1 Joe Nocera, a popular, non-business,
essayist in The New York Times wrote that “it feels as if we are at the dawn of
a new movement—one aimed at overturning the hegemony of shareholder
value.”2
This rethinking is most obvious around the issue of “benefit corporations,”
a new type of business classification increasingly popular around the country.
Benefit corporations are for-profit corporations that are also required to create
“a material, positive impact on society and the environment and to meet higher

∗ Kent Greenfield is Professor of Law and Dean’s Research Scholar at Boston College Law School,
where he teaches courses in business law and constitutional law. He is the former chair of the Business
Associations Section of the Association of American Law Schools and the author of the book THE FAILURE OF
CORPORATE LAW: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS AND PROGRESSIVE POSSIBILITIES.
1 Justin Fox & Jay W. Lorsch, What Good Are Shareholders?, 90 HARV. BUS. REV. 49, 57 (2012).
2 Joe Nocera, Down with Shareholder Value, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2010, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/11/opinion/nocera-down-with-shareholder-value.html?_r=0.
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standards of accountability and transparency.”3 At the time of this writing,
eighteen states—including Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Vermont—have
adopted legislation allowing corporations to opt-in to the benefit corporation
framework of obligations. Even Delaware, the most popular state for business
incorporations, recently adopted a benefit corporation statute.
The supporters of benefit corporations argue that the framework will
liberate businesses from the market demands of Wall Street and the legal
demands of shareholder plaintiffs seeking to hold management accountable for
decisions that fail to put shareholder interests first. They also say that
companies choosing the status can brand themselves as green and societyminded. (Patagonia recently opted-in to benefit corporation status, a good test
for this branding strategy.)
My own work as a legal scholar for almost two decades has focused on the
very problems that motivate the move toward benefit corporations. I believe
short-term shareholder focus creates risks for both corporations and society. I
have argued that the fiduciary duties of corporations and their managers should
run toward a broader set of the company stakeholders.
But I am a skeptic of benefit corporations. Here’s why.
* They are voluntary. Once corporations opt-in to the framework, a set of
requirements kick in. But the decision to opt-in is voluntary, which means that
the corporations that most need the strictures of the framework are the least
likely to opt-in.
* They are based on a misreading of the law. Under current law, courts
are quite deferential to the decisions of management. Under the “business
judgment rule,” courts will only set aside the decisions of management if they
are tainted with self-interest or grossly misinformed. (And then only rarely.) So
under current law, if a board wants to support charitable causes, pay employees
more, or voluntarily reduce pollutive emissions, there is no doubt that they can
do so without fearing legal recourse.
* They don’t add much. What’s more, most states make this freedom
explicit in the corporate statute. In Massachusetts, for example, the statute for
run-of-the mill business corporations includes a provision stating that directors
may, in discharging their duties, “consider the interests of the corporation’s
employees, suppliers, creditors and customers, the economy of the state, the
3

BENEFIT CORP INFORMATION CENTER (Jan. 11, 2014), http://www.benefitcorp.net.
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region and the nation, community and societal considerations, and the longterm and short-term interests of the corporation and its shareholders.”4 The
problem, then, is not that managers are not permitted to act with an an eye
toward society. The problem is that they are not required to do so. Benefits
corporation statutes do not solve this problem.
* They do not protect companies from market pressure. Because not all
companies will choose to become benefit corporations, those that do will suffer
competitive disadvantage in the capital market, at least in the short term. Some
shareholders may accept the lower returns implicit in the benefit corporation
framework, but most will not. So the cost of capital will be higher for benefit
corporations than for their non-benefit competitors. The problem with this is
that over time, a focus on values other than shareholder profit will appear to be
hurtful to a company’s fortunes. The way to make sure attentiveness to social
needs won’t hurt a company? Level the playing field to mandate such
attentiveness by all corporations. This, of course, is not what benefit
corporation statutes do.
* They might embolden other companies to act poorly. Advocates of
benefit corporations say that without such a framework, companies might be
punished for doing the right thing. As I explain above, I think that’s a
misreading of the law. But a lot of people believe it, and the creation of benefit
corporation statutes will strengthen the misconception. The result? Companies
that do not choose to become benefit corporations—that is, most of them—will
be able to say to shareholder, consumer, and community activists that they
should take their concerns elsewhere. In a way, a company’s decision to not
choose benefit corporation status will amount to a branding strategy as well,
but the opposite of what the benefit corporation stands for. Wall Street will
love it, and managers of those companies will be encouraged to act even worse
than they do now.
* They distract from other, more fundamental changes. You’ve guessed
by now that my problem with benefit corporations is not that they do too much
but that they do too little. There are a range of more fundamental changes to
corporate governance that are attainable in this historical moment, and I fear
that an emphasis on benefit corporations will take the air out of the reform
balloon. We could require all corporations to take into account the concerns
and interests of all their important stakeholders; we could require corporations
4
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to tell the truth to their employees; we could require major corporations to
include employee representatives on their boards, as is the case in many
countries in Europe. These changes in corporate governance could create
significant benefits to corporations and to society more broadly. A statute
creating a new framework for some companies, and only those that choose it,
is merely treading water.
* They might create weird free speech implications. Finally, I have an
additional worry created by recent Supreme Court cases about free speech. The
Court’s 2010 decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission
protected the First Amendment rights of for-profit corporations to engage in
political activity. Ten years earlier, the Court ruled in Boy Scouts v. Dale that
some non-profits have a First Amendment right to have anti-discrimination
laws not apply to them, if the forced inclusion of certain individuals would be
against the group’s beliefs. Now consider how these cases could work together
in the context of a benefit corporation that stated a belief that, for example,
homosexuality is an abomination (remember a certain fast-food chicken
sandwich company?) or that the Affordable Care Act’s mandate that
companies provide health insurance that includes contraceptive care violates
their belief in the sanctity of life. I think it is a reasonable fear that companies
organized as benefit corporations could, if they chose to, claim a First
Amendment-based exception to otherwise applicable anti-discrimination laws
or insurance mandates. This would certainly be an unintended consequence of
the benefit corporation statutes, but I think it is a real possibility that
corporations win such cases in the near future.5
So all in all, I believe the motivation behind benefit corporations is nothing
but laudable. I, too, believe that we need to figure out how to rein in the worst
excesses of corporations, while empowering corporations and those who
manage them to act with a broader and more robust sense of fiduciary duty. I,
too, believe the current legal framework contains fundamental flaws.

5 See, e.g., Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 724
F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2013) (holding, 2–1, that corporations may not claim Free Exercise rights), cert. granted,
134 S. Ct. 678 (2013). For a discussion concerning a corporation’s nonfinancial interests, see id. at 389–405
(Jordan, J., dissenting) (arguing that some corporations have interests beyond the financial, pointing to benefit
corporations to “undermine the narrow view that all for-profit corporations are concerned with profit
maximization alone.”). Conestoga Wood has been consolidated for Supreme Court review with Sebelius v.
Hobby Lobby Stores, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013); the cases were argued on March 25, 2014, but yet
decided at the time of this writing.
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But I am skeptical of the power of benefit corporation statutes to make
genuine advances here. If we are in need of a genuine re-thinking, I think we
need to be bolder.

